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Thi s paper  provi des  a novel   analysi s of  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean f i nanci al  cri sis draw ing  on  t he 
f i ndi ngs  of  a uni que  survey  of  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank  off i cials and  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts. 
The s ur vey reveals that  over -opt i mi sm  and i nadequat e recogni t i on of fi nanci al ri sks 
i nadvert entl y l ed to excessive ri sk taking by K orean fi nanci al int erme d i ari es. It  also 
i ndi cates that  t he sources of over-opt i mi sti c assessm ents of Eas t  As i an econom i es, 
i ncl udi ng K orea, we r e m ainl y t o be found out side East  As i a, incl udi ng t he IMF ,  the 
Wo r l d Bank,  we s t ern m edi a and analyst s. W eaknesses in ri sk m anagem ent  we r e the 
r esult  of (i )  lack of expert i se in relati on t o handl i ng t he ri sks associated w it h capit al 
f l ow s,  and (i i )  di sincenti ves t o m anage ri sks em anati ng fr om  a relati vel y successful  
hi story of governm ent  provi ded safety net s for bot h i ndust r y and banki ng.  Fi nanci al 
l i berali sati on w i dened ri sk-taking opport uni t i es, by al l ow i ng l endi ng t o com panies
out side  Ko r ea.    I t   also created addi t i onal   di sincenti ves  f or  m anagi ng  r i sk by  i nt ensif yi ng 
com peti t i on and erodi ng bank fr anchise values.  Fi nal l y,  w eaknesses in prudent i al
r egul ati on al l ow ed bank port f ol i os t o becom e m uch ri skier,  im port antl y i n t erms  o f  
ma t uri t y m i s-m atches bet w een dol l ar-denom i nat ed assets and l i abil i t i es.    The  l i qui di t y 
cri sis,  wh i ch fol l ow ed t he r e-assessm ent  of  t he Sout h Ko r ean econom y by i nt ernat i onal  
l enders i n l ate 1997,   t r i ggered a f ul l -blow n f i nanci al  cri sis because of  t he absence of  an 
eff ecti ve i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort .
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1.   Introduct i on
Fi nanci al l i berali sati on i nvol ves a relaxati on of i nt erest r ate and capit al cont r ol s,
t herefore, it  ma y  i n pri nci pl e lead to a m ore eff i cient all ocati on of  credit  wi t h banks 
ma k i ng hi gher  r eturns on t hei r   l oans ( Fr y,   1995).   Fi nanci al  l i berali sati on,   how ever,   also 
off ers fert i l e ground for banks t o i ndul ge i n m oral hazard behavi our (Ca pr i o,  1992;  
Mc Ki nnon and Pi l l ,   1997;   Cor sett i ,   Per senti   and Roubi ni ,   1999;  H uang and Xu ,   1999;  
He l l m ann,  Mu r dock and St i gl i t z, 2000).  Indeed, i ncreased deposit  rate com peti t i on
erodes profi t s and l ow ers f r anchise val ues ( i . e.  t he capit ali sed val ue of  expected f ut ure 
profi t s),  wh i ch in t urn creates incenti ves for ma k i ng ri sky l oans (He l l m ann M urdock 
and St i gl i t z, 2000).  G overnm ent  provi ded safety net s in a l i berali sed fi nanci al ma r ket  
ma y  a l so induce m oral hazard behavi our.  Indeed, such safety net s m ay lead to over-
i nvest me n t   i n unprofi t able proj ects and ma y   persist  because t he governm ent ’ s prom i se 
of a bail out  all ow s banks t o gai n access to foreign borr ow i ng (Cor sett ie t  al ,   1999).  
Fi nanci al li berali sati on m ay,  therefore, induce ri skier banki ng behavi our and off ers an 
envi r onm ent   i n wh i ch a f i nanci al  cri sis ma y   occur.
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f i ndi ngs  of  a uni que  survey  of  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank  off i cials and  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts. 
The s ur vey reveals that  over -opt i mi sm  and i nadequat e recogni t i on of fi nanci al ri sks 
i nadvert entl y l ed to excessive ri sk taking by K orean fi nanci al int erme d i ari es. It  also 
i ndi cates that  t he sources of over-opt i mi sti c assessm ents of Eas t  As i an econom i es, 
i ncl udi ng K orea, we r e m ainl y t o be found out side East  As i a, incl udi ng t he IMF ,  the 
Wo r l d Bank,  we s t ern m edi a and analyst s. W eaknesses in ri sk m anagem ent  we r e the 
1  For   a r ecent  account   of  t he  r ol e of  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  i n  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean econom y  see De me t r i ades
and  Lui nt el  ( 2001).2
r esult  of (i )  lack of expert i se in relati on t o handl i ng t he ri sks associated w it h capit al 
f l ow s,  and (i i )  di sincenti ves t o m anage ri sks em anati ng fr om  a relati vel y successful  
hi story of governm ent  provi ded safety net s for bot h i ndust r y and banki ng.  Fi nanci al 
l i berali sati on w i dened ri sk-taking opport uni t i es, by al l ow i ng l endi ng t o com panies
out side  Ko r ea.    I t   also created addi t i onal   di sincenti ves  f or  m anagi ng  r i sk by  i nt ensif yi ng 
com peti t i on and erodi ng bank fr anchise values.  Fi nal l y,  w eaknesses in prudent i al
r egul ati on al l ow ed bank port f ol i os t o becom e m uch ri skier,  im port antl y i n t erms  o f  
ma t uri t y m i s-m atches bet w een dol l ar-denom i nat ed assets and l i abil i t i es.    The  l i qui di t y 
cri sis,  wh i ch f ol l ow ed t he r e-assessm ent  of  t he Sout h Ko r ean econom y by i nt ernat i onal  
l enders i n l ate 1997,   t r i ggered a f ul l -blow n f i nanci al  cri sis because of  t he absence of  an 
eff ecti ve  ‘ i nt ernat i onal   l ender  of  l ast  r esort ’   ( I LLR) .
Two s et s of i nt ervi ew s w ere carr i ed out .
2.  The f i r st i n W ashi ngt on D C duri ng t he
Au t um n of 1999 and t he second i n Seoul  duri ng A pri l  2000.  A s e mi -str uct ured
quest i onnai r e relati ng t o factors that  cont r i but ed to t he cri sis w as em ployed.
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Wa s h i ngt on 15 off i cials of  t he I MF   and Wo r l d Bank we r e int ervi ew ed and i n Seoul   29 
pri vat e and publ i c sector econom i sts w ere int ervi ew ed.
4 Al l  int ervi ew ees had di r ect 
experi ence of  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean cri sis. 
The  i nt ervi ew  r esponses,   i n addi t i on t o provi di ng uni que i nsi ght s i nt o t he causes of  t he 
cri sis,  all ow  us  t o  off er  a novel   t heoreti cal  analysi s of  t he  cri sis.    To  t hi s end,   we   adopt   a 
t heoreti cal  f r am ew ork em ployed by Gr eenw ald and St i gl i t z ( 1990),   Ca pr i o ( 1992),   and 
2  The  surveys we r e carr i ed out   by Pani cos De me t r i ades ( PD) .     I n Seoul ,   PD  wa s   assisted by Eun Jun Jang 
and  Ji  Eun  Jun,   w ho  acted  as  t ranslators  w here  necessary.
3 Dr  Ma r k St ein,  of Sout h Bank U ni versit y Busi ness School ,  off ered advi ce w it h respect t o t he
f ormu l ati on  of  t he  quest i onnai r e.
4 A p r ofi l e of the post s held by Sout h K orean econom i sts at the t i me  o f  the cri sis is report ed in t he 
A ppendi x.3
Gr eenw ald,  Levi nson and St i gl i t z (1993).  Specif i call y,  we  s t udy t he choi ce of bank 
port f ol i os under  condi t i ons of  over -opt i mi sm ,  mo r al  hazard and i ncreased com peti t i on.  
A ddi t i onal l y,   we   ut i l i se banki ng and f i nanci al  dat a t o soli di f y t he argum ent s devel oped.  
The di agra mma t i c analysi s off ers a useful  exposi t i on of the l i nks bet w een fi nanci al 
l i berali sati on and banki ng cri ses,  and,   as such,  provi des mo r e general  pol i cy l essons f or 
f i nanci al  l i berali sati on.  
The areas that  the survey focuses on are refl ected in t he st r uct ure of the paper.  Thus,  
Secti on 2 focuses on over -opt i mi sm  and studi es it s imp a c t  on banki ng behavi our.  
Secti ons 3 and 4 present an analogous anal ysi s of mo r al hazard and fi nanci al
l i berali sati on  r especti vel y.     Secti on  5  provi des  a synt hesi s of  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean f i nanci al 
cri sis.  Fi nal l y,   Secti on  6  s u mma r i ses and  concl udes.  
2.   Ov e r - opti mi sm
2. 1  Survey result s
Tabl e 1  r eport s r esponses  t o  quest i ons  concerni ng  over-opti mi sm .  For   each quest i on  t he 
num ber t hat  respond i n each category of response i s report ed (percentages are in
parentheses).  In order to com pare the perspecti ves of IMF  a n d  Wo r l d Bank off i cials 
( Wa s h )  wi t h t he pri vat e and publ i c sector econom i sts fr om  Sout h K orea (SK)  thei r  
r esponses  are r eport ed separately  f or  each quest i on.  
Bot h t he Sout h K orean econom i sts and t he IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials agreed that  
econom i c agents had over-opt i mi sti c expectati ons about  the prospect s of Eas t  As i an 
econom i es pri or t o t he cri sis. The I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials appeared to be m ore 
cert ain of thi s as 86. 67%  t hought  thi s w as the case against  65. 52%  of Sout h K orean 4
econom i sts. Bot h groups of indi vi dual s thought  the i nforma t i on produced by t he IMF  
and Wo r l d Bank r egardi ng t he prospect s of  t he Eas t   As i an econom y wa s   not   accurate; 
80%  and 72. 41% ,  r especti vel y.  Ne v e r t hel ess, a low er proport i on of each group
consi dered t hi s t o be a cont r i but ory f actor  t o over-opt i mi sm  ( 44. 83%   of  Sout h  Ko r ean 
econom i sts and 40%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials).  In addi t i on,  31. 03%  of Sout h 
Ko r ean econom i sts and 33. 33%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials thought  the assessm ents 
mi ght   have  been a f actor.   Thus,   a l arge  proport i on  of  i nt ervi ew ees we r e at  l east  i ncl i ned 
t o poi nt  to t he IM F and W orl d B ank assessm ents of the East  As i an econom y as a 
cont r i but ory factor tow ards over-opt i mi sm  concerni ng econom i c prospect s i n t he area. 
Mo s t  IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials (66. 67% ) also thought  t hat t he w est ern m edi a and 
f i nanci al analyst s w ere responsi bl e for generati ng over -opt i mi sm  concerni ng t he
prospect s of the East  As i an econom i es. Sout h K orean econom i sts, how ever,  we r e less 
i ncl i ned t o bl am e t he we s t ern me d i a as 44. 83%  t hought   t hi s wa s   t he case.  I n cont r ast,  
t he Sout h K orean econom i sts w ere m ore li kel y t o bel i eve that  t he Sout h K orean
f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons w ere over-opt i mi sti c about  invest me n t  payoff s (51. 72%  against  
46. 67% ).
2. 2  Anal ysis
Bank  m anagers ma y   pl ay an i m port ant  r ol e i n  t r ansm it t i ng  over-opt i mi sm  t hroughout   an 
econom y.  Thi s is because banks are at the centr e of the fl ow  of funds i n an econom y 
and  because t hey  pri ce credit   f or  l i qui di t y-const r ained  f i r ms   ( He r r i ng,   1999).   Thus  bank 
m anagers'  opi ni on of fi nanci al l i berali sati on i m pacts on t he non-bank pri vat e sector.  
Ov e r -opt i mi sm  of the benefi t s of fi nanci al li berali sati on m ay occur because signal s of 
poorl y perf ormi ng f i r ms   ma y   not   be r evealed due t o soft   budget   const r aint s ( H uang and 
Xu ,   1999).   Thi s sends an i ncorr ect  signal   t o ot her  econom i c agents,  generati ng undul y 5
opt i mi sti c expectati ons r egardi ng f i r ms ’   perf orm ance and m acroeconom i c perf orm ance 
i f  t hi s practi ce is w idespread. Ov e r -opt i mi sm  also m eans that  i ndi vi dual s fail  t o
appreciate invest me n t  r i sks and thei r  consequences i na  l i berali sed m arket .  Thus,
cogni t i ve  bi ases m ean t hat   i ndi vi dual s i ncorr ectl y  calculate t he  probabi l i t y  of  a f i nanci al 
cri sis ( He r r i ng,   1999).   Bank  m anagers behavi our  due  t o  over-opt i mi sm  i s not   t em pered, 
how ever,   due  t o  poor  r i sk m anagem ent   system s. 
We   m odel   t he behavi our  of  a r epresentati ve bank m anager  wo r ki ng f or  a r epresentati ve 
bank.  We  t ake the vi ew  that  t he bank m anager i s an agent of sharehol ders and
undert akes decisions on t hei r  behal f .  The mor al hazard of agents, therefore, pl ays an 
i nt egral  r ol e i n i nvest me n t   decisions.   Fol l ow i ng St i gl i t z and We i ss ( 1981),   t he m anager 
confr ont s an adverse selecti on probl em . As  t he cont r actual  rate of int erest she sets on 
l oans r i ses t here i s an i ncrease i n expected port f ol i o r eturns unt i l   t he expected port f ol i o
r eturn reaches a cri t i cal val ue and decl i nes because low er ri sk borr ow ers are deterr ed 
f r om   borr ow i ng  and  i ncreasingl y  r i skier  borr ow ers are mo r e wi l l i ng  t o  borr ow .   Thus,   as 
t he cont r actual   r ate of  i nt erest  i ncreases,  t he standard devi ati on of  t he bank manager’ s
port f ol i o al so increases. Thus,  t he l oan fr ont i er ( LF)  t akes an invert ed U -shape, as 
i l l ust r ated i n Fi gure 1.   The  bank m anager  i nt erme d i ates a gi ven l evel  of  w ealt h and has 
access t o alt ernat i ve i nvest me n t s,  governm ent   bonds,   i n wh i ch t o i nvest   a proport i on  of 
t hi s w ealt h  ( Gr eenw ald et   al ,1993).   The  governm ent   bonds yi eld an expected r eturn ( 1 
+  g)  and  are assum ed t o  have  zero  r i sk.  An   eff i cient  port f ol i o  f r ont i er  ( EP)   i s defi ned  by 
a r ay f r om  t he expected r eturn of  t he governm ent   bond ( 1 +  g)  t hat   i s t angent i al  t o t he 
l oan ri sk-return fr ont i er.  The t angency at  r is the cont r actual  loan rate that  ma x i mi ses 
t he  expected r eturn  on  l oans.   I n  Fi gure 1  t he  r epresentati ve  bank  m anager’ s i ndi f f erence 6
curve i s il l ust r ated by I 1.   I t   i s assum ed t hat   t he bank m anager  i s r i sk averse;  hence t he 
i ndi f f erence curve  i s convex  t o  t he  ori gi n.
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Ov e r -opt i mi sm  m eans that  the bank m anager expects a higher pay-off  for any gi ven 
l evel  of  r i sk.  Thus,   i n Fi gure 1 t he bank ma n a g e r   perceives t he l oan r i sk-return f r ont i er 
she faces to be LF1,  wh e n  t he t r ue fr ont i er is represented by LF0.   T he fr acti on of the 
banks asset s goi ng on l oans,  and t herefore the opt i ma l  port f ol i o,  i s determi ned by
t angency bet w een the bank m anager’ s preferences and the eff i cient port f ol i o fr ont i er.  
Wh e n   t he bank m anager  i s over-opt i mi sti c t he port f ol i o hel d i s r epresented by poi nt   a, 
wh i ch has an expected return of π
l  wi t h a st andard devi ati on of σ
l .  Coi nci dent all y,  at 
poi nt  a, the bank m anager’ s port f ol i o does not  incl ude governm ent  bonds.  Ho we v e r ,  
gi ven  t hat   t he  t r ue  l oan  f r ont i er  i s r epresented by  LF0,   t he  t r ue  eff i cient  port f ol i o  f r ont i er 
i s E P 0.   I f   t he bank m anager  decides not   t o hol d any governm ent   bonds i n her  port f ol i o 
t hen  t hi s m eans t he  port f ol i o  wi l l   be  at  poi nt   b.   Thus,   t he  expected port f ol i o  r eturn  i s π*
and t he port f ol i o standard devi ati on i s σ*.   Ther efore,  bot h t he expected port f ol i o r eturn 
i s l ow er  and  t he  port f ol i o  standard  devi ati on  i s hi gher  t han  t he  bank  m anager  bel i eves.
W e have t herefore dem onst r ated that  over-opt i mi sm  leads to bank m anagers t aking
hi gher ri sks w it h l ow er returns.  Im port antl y,  w e have al so show n t hat  ri sky behavi our 
can occur wi t hout  appeali ng t o m oral hazard behavi our.  Ef f ecti ve ri sk m anagem ent  
system s, and/ or prudent i al r egul ati on shoul d,  how ever,  be abl e to prevent such
behaviour.
5  Empl oyees are t ypi call y characteri sed as r i sk averse and r eceive i nsurance f r om  sharehol ders vi a a f i xed 
com ponent   t o  t hei r   pay  ( i . e.  salary)  wh i l e i t   i s t he  sharehol ders of  t he  f i r m  t hat   bear  t he  r i sk as t hey  deri ve 
a  r esidual   i ncom e  f r om   t he  em ployees  acti vi t i es.  Kn i ght   ( 1921)  i s an  earl y  exponent   of  t hi s vi ew .7
3.   G overnm ent  i nsurance  and  mo r a l   hazard
3. 1  Survey result s
Responses  t o  quest i ons  concerni ng  t he  f actors aff ecti ng  mo r al  hazard  wi t hi n  t he  cont ext 
of  f i nanci al  r eform  are r eport ed i n Tabl e 2.   A  hi gh proport i on ( 93. 1%  of  Sout h Ko r an 
econom i sts and 80%   of  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank  off i cials)  bel i eved t hat   Sout h  Ko r ean f i nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons enj oyed i mp l i cit  guarantees fr om  t he governm ent  pri or t o t he cri sis.
Mo r eover,   upon f urt her  quest i oni ng,   m any I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials bel i eved t hat   t he 
f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons enj oyed expl i cit  guarantees. Ther e is indi cati on fr om  K orean
econom i sts t hat   t he econom y r eli ed on governm ent   backing,   wh i ch l ed t o com placency 
and cont i nued bad l oans vi a foreign i nvest ors because of the governm ent  guarantees. 
I ndeed, 82. 76%  of Sout h K orean econom i sts and 80%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials 
bel i eved that  t hese guarantees encouraged excessive ri sk taking.  Thi s imp l i es that  
governm ent al guarantees induced i nvest or mo r al hazard.  Ne i t her group,  how ever,
t hought   t hat   t hi s f actor  wa s   t he pri me   cause behi nd  t he  cri sis.  Ne v e r t hel ess,  t he  ma j ori t y 
of Sout h K orean econom ists and IMF /  Wo r l d Bank off i cials (65. 52%  and 78. 57% ,  
r especti vel y)  t hought   i t   wa s   a cont r i but ory  f actor  t o  t he  cri sis. 
The  ma j ori t y of  bot h Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts and I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials t hought  
t he pri m e benefi ciary of post -cri sis rescue packages w ere the i nt ernat i onal
l enders/i nvest ors.  Thi s i s support ed by  t he  f act  t hat   58. 62%   of  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts 
and 53. 33%  of  I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials t hought   t hat   t he r escue packages we r e able t o 
cover a large part  of thei r  losses. For  dom est i c banks,  in cont r ast,  65. 52%  of Sout h 
Ko r ean econom i sts and 60%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials did not  thi nk t hat  dom est i c 
banks had a l arge part  of thei r  losses covered by rescue packages. Thi s suggests that  
mo r al  hazard,   i f   any,   wa s   not   associated wi t h  sharehol der  behavi our.8
The maj ori t y of Sout h K orean econom i sts and t he IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials (82. 76%  
and 80% ,  respecti vel y) we r e bot h agreed that  there had been si gni f i cant changes to 
senior m anagem ent  and/ or the board of di r ectors at tr oubl ed fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons as a 
r esult  of t he cri sis. Ther e is also som e indi cati on t hat  t hose i ndi vi dual s thought
r esponsi bl e for the cri sis w ere rem oved fr om  t hei r  post s; 60%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank 
off i cials thought  t hi s w as the case, how ever,  51. 72%  of Sout h K orean econom i sts 
t hought   onl y  som e had  been r em oved.     Ag a i n,   t hese  f i ndi ngs  seem  t o  suggest   t hat   mo r al 
hazard  behavi our  by  bank  m anagers,  i f   any,   wa s   t o  a l arge  extent  penal i sed,  even t hough 
not   f ul l y.     Thus,  the mo r al  hazard argum ent   as an expl anati on f or  excessive r i sk t aking 
by  bank  m anagers r eceives  onl y  l i mi t ed support   by  t he  survey  f i ndi ngs.
A  hi gh  proport i on  of  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts ( 82. 76% )  and  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank  off i cials 
( 80% ) thought  that  ti ght er prudent i al regul ati on coul d have m i t i gat ed the probl em  of 
excessive ri sk taking w i t hi n t he fi nanci al system . Som e suggest ed that  thi s coul d be 
achieved through a bet t er di sclosure system  m aking t he system  m ore tr ansparent,
upgrading t he l oan cl assif i cati on syst em , imp r ovi ng capi t al adequacy, and i mp r ovi ng 
account i ng practi ces.  A  t i ght er  r egul atory r egime ,   t herefore,  coul d have r educed mo r al 
hazard,   wh i ch ma n i f ested i n t he f orm  of  Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons i nvest i ng i n j unk 
bonds i n R ussia,  Thai l and,   I ndonesi a,  and  Ma l aysia. 
3. 2  Anal ysis
The analysi s w e present here considers the m oral hazard of a bank m anager and t he 
f i nanci al  i ncenti ves f or  behavi ng i n a part i cular  f ashion.   Mo r al  hazard m eans t he bank 
m anager is gam bli ng w i t h deposi t ors and credit ors cash. Thi s is not  in deposi t ors or 
credit ors best int erests. Ho we v e r ,  if  governm ent  insurance is provi ded nei t her of these 9
groups have a fi nanci al i ncenti ve t o m oni t or bank m anager behavi our.  Mo r eover,
deposi t ors and credit ors are not   concerned i f   t he bank ma n a g e r   gam bl es.  The  eff ect  of 
deposi t   i nsurance,  t herefore,  i s t o create a mo r al  hazard probl em  by creati ng i ncent i ves 
f or  t he bank m anager  t o i nvest   i n r i skier  assets t hat   yi eld hi gher  expected r eturns.   The 
bank’s sharehol ders are not  det r i me n t all y aff ect i f  they have suff i cientl y di versif i ed 
t hei r   ow n  port f ol i o.  
The pr ovi sion of deposi t  i nsurance w il l  result  i n t he bank m anager bei ng l ess ri sk 
averse, wh i ch m eans that  her indi f f erence curves becom e fl att er.  In Fi gure 2 thi s is 
i l l ust r ated by I h bei ng fl att er t han I 0.  Wh e n  f i nanci al l i berali sati on occurs and t he 
cont r ol s on i nt erest  r ates or  r eserve r equi r em ents are r educed,  t he m anager  wi l l   change 
her  port f ol i o f r om  t hat   i l l ust r ated by poi nt   a and t he opt i ma l   port f ol i o i s now  at  poi nt   c. 
Thi s has t he eff ect  of  i ncreasing t he port f ol i o standard devi ati on f r om  σ*  t o σ
h  and t he 
expected returns fr om  π* t o π
h.  In pri nci pl e, the i nvest or is sell i ng short  governm ent  
bonds and borr ow i ng at  the ri skless rate of int erest in order to i nvest  in ri skier assets. 
Gr eenw alde t  al  (1993) argue t hat  t he analysi s appl i es to any fi nanci al i nst i t ut i on
provi ded  wi t h  i mp l i cit   or  expl i cit   governm ent   i nsurance. 
An   eff ecti ve  prudent i al  r egul ator  w oul d  of  course prevent  such mo r al  hazard  behavi our.  
Ho we v e r ,  the Fi nanci al Supervi sory  Co mmi ssion (FSC) ,  a consol i dat ed supervi sory 
body w as onl y created a few  m ont hs pri or t o t he cri sis in A pri l  1998.  For me r l y,  
c o mme r cial banks w ere supervi sed by t he O ff i ce of Bank Supervi sion of the Bank of 
Ko r ea (Ba l i no and U bi de,  1999).  The com m ercial banks,  how ever,  we r e able to
ma i nt ain t r ust  account s that   we r e l ess r egul ated t han t hei r   ot her  banki ng acti vi t i es.
6  At  
6  Tr ust   account s are  considered  part   of  non- bank  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on.10
t he end of 1997 t r ust  account s account ed for 40%  of tot al banks asset s (Ba l i no and 
Ub i de,  1999).  Thus,  tr ust  accounts w ere used to ci r cum vent regul ati on on com m ercial 
bank l endi ng.  Tr ust  accounts w ere not  subj ect to reserve requi r em ents, there w ere no 
specif i c exposure li mi t s, and t here w as looser cont r ol  of i nt erest r ates. I ndeed, a
com pari son of  t he i nt erest  r ates of  D eposi t   M oney Banks ( DMBs )   and t r ust   account s i n 
Cha r t s 1a  and  1b  i l l ust r at es t hi s.
An   analysi s of  t he  credit   r i sks of  banks'   assets i l l ust r ates i ncreasingl y  r i sky  behavi our  i n 
bank  practi ce.  A  num ber  of  i ndi cators suggest   t hat   t he  credit   r i sk of  assets hel d  by  banks 
wa s   becom ing i ncreasingl y hi gh i n t he earl y 1990s.   D ool ey and Shi n ( 2000)  r eport   t hat  
t he proport i on of  credit   suppl i ed by banks as a proport i on of  t ot al  credit   i ncreased f r om  
about   54%  i n 1990 and r eached a peak of  63%  i n 1996,   t he year  pri or  t o t he f i nanci al 
cri sis. Mo r eover,  the proport i on of credit  wi t h col l ateral  to t ot al credit  decli ned fr om  
40%   i n  1990  t o  about   31%   i n  1996.   No t e,  how ever,   t hat   t he  proport i on  of  credit   wi t h  no 
coll ateral  f orme d   about   54%   i n  1997.   Thi s decli ne  f r om   t he  1996  f i gure coul d  be  due  t o 
l oan w ri t e-off s. An  i ncrease in port f ol i o ri sk isi l l ust r ated by an increase in t he
proport i on of securi t i es in banks asset  port f ol i os fr om  12%  i n 1990 t o 16%  i n 1997.  
Securi t i es are exposed  t o  pri ce changes com pared t o  cash,  call   l oans  and  deposi t s i . e.  t he 
ot her  assets i n  a f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ari es port f ol i o.
E xcessive r i sk-taking by banks ma y   we l l   l ead t o bank r uns and f i nanci al  pani c.  D ool ey 
and  Shi n  ( 2000)  state t hat   wh e n   t he  cont i ngent   l i abil i t i es of  t he  governm ent   are equal   t o 
t he governm ent ’ s assets,  com peti t i on am ongst   bank deposi t ors and credit ors wi l l   m ean 
t hat  the i nsurance opti on i s exercised. Thus,  invest ors'  mo r al hazard and a desi r e to 
avoi d l osses cause t he att ack.    The  Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts we   surveyed t hought   t hat  11
we s t ern  i nvest ors decidi ng  not   t o  r enew /r ol l over  l oans  and  ot her  credit s t o  Sout h  Ko r ean 
f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons wa s   a ma n i f estati on of  such f i nanci al  pani c.  I ndeed,  t he evidence 
suggest s that  thi s did occur,  part i cularl y i n N ovem ber and D ecem ber of 1997,  despi t e 
t he Ko r ean governm ent   announci ng a r escue package on 21 N ovem ber  1997.     Be t w een 
July and O ct ober 1997 t he rol l over rate of the seven l argest  Sout h K orean B anks w as 
generall y over  85%  ( i n A ugust   i t   wa s   about   79% ),   how ever,   i n N ovem ber  t hi s r ate had 
dropped t o 58. 8%  and i n D ecem ber  i t   had dropped t o 32. 2%  ( D ool ey and Shi n,   2000).  
The decli ne i n rol l over/ r enew  rates could be due t o w est ern i nvest ors reassessing t he 
Sout h K orean econom y due t o t he cri sis in Thai l and and i n t he region i n general,  
generati ng f ear  of  a cont agion eff ect.   Ther e ma y   also have been concern t hat   t he Bank 
of  Ko r ea wa s   unabl e t o m eet  governm ent   guarantees t o bot h dom est i c and i nt ernat i onal  
l enders.  Cha r t   2 i l l ust r ates t hat   t he pani c by i nt ernat i onal   i nvest ors caused t he Bank of 
Ko r ea' s foreign exchange reserves t o decl i ne fr om  $29. 73 bi l l i on i n O ct ober 1997 t o 
$19. 71  bi l l i on  i n  D ecem ber  1997.  
We   have t herefore,  i l l ust r ated t he eff ect  of  mo r al  hazard on bank m anagers'   preferences 
and  t he  subsequent   eff ect  on  t he  port f ol i o  t hey  hol d.   Mo r eover,   i f   all   i nvest ors behave  i n 
t he sam e wa y   as t he r epresentati ve bank m anager,   t he i ndi vi dual   behavi our  of  i nvest ors 
ma y  l ead to i ncreased system ic ri sk and pendi ng fi nanci al cri sis. The f ocus on pri vat e 
r eturns  does  not   consi der  social  costs,  especiall y  i n  t he  f orm  of  system ic r i sk.
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4.   Fi nanci al   l i berali sati on,   com peti t i on  and  mo r a l   hazard
4. 1  Survey result s
7 Thus,   financi al  stabil i t y  can  be  t hought   of  as  a  publ i c  good.12
Tabl e 3  r eport s r esponses  t o  quest i ons  r elati ng  t o  f i nanci al  l i berali sati on  i n  Sout h  Ko r ea. 
58. 62%  of Ko r ean econom i sts and 66. 67%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials beli eve that  
f i nanci al l i berali sati on vi a the rem oval of int erest rate restr aint s and capit al cont r ol s 
l eads to bot h hi gher invest me n t  returns and a m ore eff i cient all ocati on of resources. 
55. 17%   of  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts and  53. 33%   of  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank  off i cials bel i eved 
t hat  f i nanci al l i berali sati on pl ayed a rol e in generati ng over -opt i mi sm  regardi ng
i nvest me n t  payoff s. Som e Sout h K orean econom i sts furt her argued t hat  we s t ern
i nvest ors ini t i all y gai ned fr om  hi gh returns i n K orea but we r e operati ng under an
i l l usi on  t hat   em ergi ng  ma r ket s yi eld  hi gher  r eturns,  possibl y  due  t o  herdi ng  behavi our.  
I ncreased invest me n t  payoff s coul d com e at a cost i. e. increased ri sk undert aken by 
i nvest ors.  I ndeed,  65. 52%   of  Sout h  Ko r ean econom i sts and  93. 33%   of  I MF / Wo r l d  Bank 
off i cials beli eved that  fi nanci al li berali sati on l ed t o i ncreased r i sks wi t hi n t he f i nanci al 
system ,  i n t he f orm  of  credit   r i sk and exchange r i sk.  De s p i t e t he perceived i ncrease i n 
r i sk as a consequence of fi nanci al li berali sati on,  86. 21%  of Sout h K orean econom i sts 
and 93. 33%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials thought  t hat  t he Sout h K orean fi nanci al
i nst i t ut i ons di d not  have i n pl ace the ri sk m anagem ent  system s that  are requi r ed to 
m anage t he new  t ypes of ri sk that  ari se as a consequence of fi nanci al li berali sati on.  
Mo r eover,  75. 86%  of Sout h K orean econom i sts and 86. 67%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank 
off i cials thought  that  Sout h K orean fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons w ere not  equi pped w i t h t he 
hum an capit al and expert i se to adequat ely m anage t he ri sks associated w it h t he
i nt erme d i ati on  of  l arge  am ount s of  f oreign  capit al.   I n  addi t i on,   96. 55%   of  Sout h  Ko r ean 
econom i sts and 73. 33%  of I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials thought  t hat  t he i nst i t ut i onal
f r am ew ork of  prudent i al  r egul ati on and supervi sion wa s   not   suff i cientl y we l l   devel oped 
t o deal  wi t h t he ri sks associated w it h t he subst anti al vol um es of  capit al fl ow s.  Gi ven 13
t hi s background i n wh i ch f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons we r e operati ng,   t he f act  t hat   72. 41%  of 
Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts and 100%  of  I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials t hought   t hat   Ko r ean 
f i nanci al inst i t ut i ons and t he fi nanci al system , on bal ance, faced increased ri sk m eant 
t hat  fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons w oul d face probl em s w hen operati ng i n a m ore li berali sed 
envi r onm ent .   I ndeed,  credit   r i sk,  ma r ket   r i sk,  exchange r ate r i sk,  i nt erest,   r ate r i sk,  and 
l i qui di t y ri sks w ere all  ident i f i ed by Sout h K orean econom ists and IMF / Wo r l d Bank 
off i cials as dif f erent types of ri sk that  the fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons and regul ators had t o 
f ace. Mo r eover,  86. 21 %  of Sout h K orean econom i sts and 80%  of IMF / Wo r l d Bank 
off i cials thought  t hat  f i nanci al l i berali sati on pl ayed eit her a si gni f i cant or very
signi f i cant  f actor  behi nd t he f i nanci al  cri sis.  Al t hough t here ma y   have been a cont agion 
eff ect  despi t e l i berali sati on,   f i nanci al  l i berali sati on and t he l ack of  prudent i al  r egul ati on 
all ow ed  me r chant  banks  t o  borr ow   short   t erm  and  l end l ong  t erm,   creati ng  f ert i l e ground 
f or  a l i qui di t y  cri sis. 
De s p i t e t he ma j ori t y of  bot h Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts and I MF /   Wo r l d Bank off i cials 
bel i eving t hat  fi nanci al li berali sati on w oul d l ead to hi gher invest me n t  returns,  65. 52%  
of the forme r  and 53. 33%  of the l att er thought  that  fi nanci al li berali sati on l ed to t he 
profi t s of fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons bei ng eff ected dow nw ards.  M any K orean econom i sts 
w ho t hought  t hat  profi t s w oul d be aff ected dow nw ards at t r i but ed thi s to i ncreased 
com peti t i on and l ow er  i nt erest  r ate ma r gi ns.
Tabl e 4 report s the concl udi ng quest i ons regardi ng t he fi nanci al cri sis. Mo s t  of the 
I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials, 73. 33% ,  thought  that  the cri sis coul d have been avoi ded 
wh e r eas 48.28%  of Sout h K orean econom i sts concurr ed w it h t hi s view . B ett er
prudent i al supervi sion w as t he factor chiefl y m ent i oned t hat  coul d achieve thi s. Thus 14
r esult i ng i n l ess ri sk taking and l ess exposure to default .  Sl ow er r eforms ,  bet t er
understandi ng of the l i nks bet w een the corporate and fi nanci al sectors, and i mp r oved
corporate governance so t hat  fi r ms  we r e not  exposed t o hi gh debt / equi t y rati os w ere 
also cit ed as f actors t hat   coul d  have  prevented t he  probl em . 
A h i gher proport i on of Sout h K orean econom i sts (79. 31% ) com pared to IMF / Wo r l d 
Bank off i cials (46. 67% ) t hought  t hat  i nt ernat i onal  l enders over-reacted to t he cri sis 
wh e n  t hey deci ded not  to renew  or rol l over loans and ot her credit s to Sout h K orean 
i nst i t ut i ons.   Thi s wa s   att r i but ed t o  a coordi nat i on  probl em  as once t he  pani c start ed t hen 
i t  wa s  r ati onal  t o j oi n i n,  alt hough som e t hought  t hi s w as herdi ng behavi our.  The 
behavi our of we s t ern i nvest ors w as also perceived as short -termi st causing fi nanci al 
di str ess for som e K orean fi r ms  ( e.g.  Sam sung El ectr oni cs).  Indeed, 93. 1%  of Sout h 
Ko r ean econom i sts and 86. 67%  of  I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials t hought   t hat   t he r eacti on 
of  we s t ern i nvest ors t o t he cri sis wa s   eit her  a cont r i but ory f actor  or  t he pri me   cause f or 
exacerbat i ng  t he  f i nanci al  cri sis. 
The  consequences of  t he f i nanci al  cri sis f or  borr ow ers we r e pot enti all y seri ous because 
51. 72%  of  Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts and 53. 33%  of  I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials t hought  
t hat  il l i qui d borr ow ers becam e insol vent  as a result  of the cri sis. Ther e is, therefore, 
som e evidence  t o  suggest   t hat   t he  Ko r ean f i nanci al  cri sis wa s   t r i ggered by  t he  i l l i qui di t y 
of  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons em anati ng f r om  w eaknesses i n r i sk m anagem ent   and prudent i al 
r egul ati on.   A ddi t i onal   i nforma t i on coll ected duri ng t he i nt ervi ew s suggest ed t hat   t hese 
m echanism s ma n i f ested t hem sel ves i n t he f orm  of  borr ow i ng and mat uri t y mi sm atches, 
ste mmi ng fr om  short -term  borr ow i ng fr om  overseas sources and longer -term l endi ng,  
again mo s t l y t o overseas borr ow ers.  These acti vi t i es essenti all y undermi ned t he abil i t y 15
of  t he Bank of  Ko r ea t o act  as a ‘ l ender  of  l ast  r esort ’   ( LLR)   since t hese l i abil i t i es we r e 
denom i nat ed i n  f oreign  curr encies.
4. 2  Anal ysis
The abil i t y t o raise fi nance vi a the i ssue of foreign curr ency denom i nat ed bonds and 
deposi t s increased the l endi ng capacit y of f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons i n Sout h K orea.
Fi nanci al li berali sati on also m eant  t hat   Sout h Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons we r e able t o 
i nvest  i n R ussia, Thai l and,  Ma l aysia, and Indonesi a, as expressed by t he i nt ervi ew
r espondent s above.   No t wi t hst andi ng  t he  openi ng  of  new   ma r ket s i n  wh i ch Sout h  Ko r ean 
f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons coul d l end,  t he fi ndi ngs i n Secti on 4. 1 reveal t hat  i ncreased
com peti t i on r educed profi t   ma r gi ns as a consequence of  r educed i nt erest  r ate ma r gi ns.  
I ndeed,  f or  DMBs ,   Cha r t   1a i ndi cates t hat   pri or  t o t he cri sis i nt erest  r ate ma r gi ns i n t he 
dom est i c m arket  we r e narr ow i ng,  part i cularl y on t i m e deposi t s of less than 6 m ont hs 
and  general  l oans  of  nat i onw i de  c o mme r cial  banks.   Mo r eover,   t he  i nt erest  r ates on  t hese 
product s w ere vir t ual l y i dent i cal in l ate 1997 t o earl y 1998 and i nt erest rates on t i me  
deposi t s of  l ess t han 6 m ont hs we r e hi gher  t han t hose on general  l oans i n mi d 1998.   I n 
January 1998,  int erest rates on nat i onw i d e  c o mme r cial banks general loans reached a 
peak of 17. 53%  w hi l e deposi t  m oney banks w ere payi ng 18. 26%  on t i m e deposi t s of 
l ess than 6 m ont hs.     I n cont r ast,   Cha r t   1b i ndi cates t hat   t r ust   account   l oan and deposi t  
r ates di d not   narr ow  pri or  t o t he cri sis.  Thus,   we   can see w hy deposi t s and l oans f r om  
t hese  account s we r e att r acti ve  t o  c o mme r cial  banks.  
Gi ven  t hat   t here wa s   an over-suppl y  of  credit ,   com peti t i on  w oul d  l ead t o  a decli ne  i n  t he 
cont r actual  rate of int erest for a given si ze of loan unt i l  credit  ma r ket  equi l i bri um  i s 
att ained.   I n Fi gure 3,   t he decli ne i n l endi ng r ates i s m odel l ed by i nt erest  r ates decli ni ng 16
f r om  r   t o r
c.   I f   governm ent   bond r ates r em ain unchanged,   t hi s has t he eff ect  of  r ot ati ng 
t he eff i cient port f ol i o fr ont i er,  f r om  EPr t o EPc.  Gi ven t he i nvest or’ s ri sk-return
preferences the equi l i bri um  port f ol i o shi f t s fr om  poi nt  a to poi nt  b.  Thus,  the i nvest or 
ma k e s   a l ow er  cont r actual   r eturn,   π
c,   on a port f ol i o wi t h a l ow er  standard devi ati on σ
c.
Theor eti call y,  thi s shoul d cause a decli ne i n l oan i nvest me n t s, therefore, reduci ng t he 
suppl y of loans (Gr eenw ald and St i gl i t z, 1990).  In practi ce, how ever,  opt i mi sm  in t he 
Sout h K orean econom y m eant  t hat  Sout h K orean fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons w ere able to 
obt ain  f unds  on  t he  i nt ernat i onal   ma r ket s i n  order  t o  cont i nue  ma k i ng  l oans  and  prop  up 
unprofi t able i nvest me n t s.
The i ncrease in com peti t i on l eads to decl i ni ng returns,  wh i ch imp l i es low er fr anchise 
values.   I f   t he  stock  ma r ket   i s eff i cient,   t he  equi t y  val ue  of  t he  bank  wi l l   r efl ect  t he  l ow er 
f r anchise val ue  of  t he  bank.   Cha r t   3  show s  t he  stock  ma r ket   perf orm ance of  r etail   banks 
and fi nanci al servi ces. The s t ock m arket  index show s t he decl i ne of fi nanci al  servi ces 
and retail  banks pri or to t he cri sis. Thi s coul d be due t o a reassessm ent of the Sout h 
Ko r ean econom y as t here is also a decli ne i n t he K orean Stock Pri ce Index (KOSPI ) .  
The equit y i ndex of retail  banks generall y out perf orms  t he KOSPI  unt i l  No v e mb e r
1993,   wh e r e t he  r etail   banks  and  f i nanci al  servi ces under-perf orm  t he  r est  of  t he  ma r ket .  
Thi s coul d be due t o t he equi t y m arket  r espondi ng t o fi nanci al l i berali sati on and
expecti ng t he fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons profi t s to reduce as a consequence. In addi t i on,  it  
ma y  r efl ect t he m arket ' s assessm ent of f i nanci al i nst i t ut i ons undert aking ri sky
i nvest me n t s t hrough,   f or  i nst ance,  t r ust   account s. 
Lower   f r anchise val ues l ow er  t he i ncenti ves f or  ma k i ng good qual i t y l oans and i ncrease 
t he m oral hazard of the i nvest or  ( He l l m ann et  al ,  2000).  Wh e t her the bank m anager’ s 17
skil l s are fi r m -specif i c or general,  if  there is a decli ne i n t he fr anchise value t he bank 
m anager has i ncenti ves t o gam bl e.
8 Wh e n  t he bank m anager has fi r m -specif i c skil l s 
( Wi l l i am son,  1986) she invest s in m ore ri sky assets to save her j ob and cont i nue 
r eceivi ng  r em unerati on  f or  such skil l s.  I f   her  hum an  capit al  i s general  she gam bl es i n  an 
att em pt  t o i ncrease t he bank’s f r anchise val ue so t hat   she i s not   associated wi t h f ail ure, 
wh i ch w oul d  det r i me n t all y  aff ect  f ut ure l i f eti me   earni ngs  ( Fam a,   1980).   Thus,   a decli ne 
i n fr anchise value w i l l  lead to t he bank m anager becom ing l ess ri sk averse. The bank 
m anager’ s indi f f erence curve w i l l  fl att en, t herefore, fr om  I 0 to I h.  Consequent l y,  the 
eff i cient port f ol i o t hat  the bank m anager hol ds i s at poi nt  c. The port f ol i o st andard 
devi ati on i s now σ
h wi t h a return of π
h.  In t hi s case, t he fi nanci al i nst i t ut i ons are 
borr ow i ng at  the governm ent  bond rate because of governm ent  guarantees. Indeed, in 
order t o cont i nue att r acti ng i nt ernat i onal  i nvest me n t  t he Sout h K orean governm ent  
provi ded  i mp l i cit   and  expl i cit   guarantees. 
W e have,  t herefore, dem onst r ated that  wh e n  f i nanci al l i berali sati on occurs w it h a
subsequent  increase in com peti t i on i n t he l oan m arket ,  thi s leads t o t he bank m anager 
undert aking excessive ri sk because of a decli ne i n t he bank' s fr anchise value.  If  the 
analysi s f or  t he r epresentati ve bank m anager  and bank are extr apol ated t o all   f i nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons  i n  t he  econom y,   t hen  we   see how   t he  acti ons  of   i ndi vi dual   agents can create 
system ic ri sk. Indeed, D ool ey and Shin (2000) suggest  that  li berali sati on reduced the 
f r anchise value of the banki ng system  exposi ng w eak bal ance sheets to com peti t i ve 
pressures that  prom ot ed ri skier behavi our by banks.  Increased ri skiness of invest or 
port f ol i os ma y   also l ead t o a decli ne i n f r anchise val ues ( D ool ey,  2000).   Ko r ean banks 
8 No t e that  the i nvest or is gam bli ng by l endi ng t hi s to a recipi ent,  w ho i s w il l i ng t o accept the credit  
because i t   ma y   prevent  bankrupt cy f or  t he  f i r m,   wh i ch t he  r ecipi ent  i s a m anager  of,   i n  t he  short   r un  and 
provi de an opport uni t y t o restr uct ure the fi r m’ s acti vi t i es and m ake an unprofi t able fi r m  and/ or acti vi t y 
profi t able i n  t he  f ut ure.18
we r e r eplacing r i skless assets wi t h r i skier  securi t i es t hat   we r e exposed t o greater  pri ce 
changes. Bank m anagers’ we r e, t herefore, i n a vi cious cycle that  wa s  p r om pt ed by 
com peti t i on bet w een banks,   wh i ch r educed f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons'   f r anchise val ues.
5.   Synt hesi s
Fi nanci al l i berali sati on l ed to i ncreased lendi ng and borr ow i ng opport uni t i es as it
all ow ed non-bank f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons and banks t o undert ake new  acti vi t i es t hat   we r e 
previousl y  unavai l able t o  t hem .   I ndeed,  Sout h  Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ari es expl oi t ed 
t hese new  opport uni t i es. Cha r t  4 i ndi cates a steady i ncrease in bot h t he foreign asset s 
and  l i abil i t i es of  DMBs   t hroughout   t he  1990s.   Pr i or  t o  t he  cri sis and  t hroughout   mu c h   of 
t he 1990s,  how ever,  Sout h K orean D M B s foreign l i abil i t i es w ere greater than t hei r  
assets.  Thi s gap  r eached a peak of  $12. 14  bi l l i on  i n  Oc t ober  1997.  
Fi nanci al li berali sati on al so created the pot enti al for  increased returns and i mp r oved 
eff i ciency i n t he all ocati on of  capit al.   I t   also brought ,   how ever,   i ncreased r i sk because 
Sout h K orean fi nanci al i nt erme d i ari es operated in m arket s in w hi ch they had no
previous experi ence (e.g.  R ussia, Ma l aysia, Indonesi a, and Thai l and).  Ov e r -opt i mi sm
and m oral hazard am ongst  fi nanci al invest ors, cit ed by t he survey respondent s, led to 
i ncreasingl y ri sky i nvest me n t s. In addi t i on,  ‘di saster m yopi a’ ma y  a l so have pl ayed a 
r ol e in generati ng over-opt i mi sm  ( He r r i ng,   1999).   Poor  r i sk m anagem ent   system s and a 
l ack of supervi sory cont r ol  (bot h w i t hi n fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons and fr om  t he regul atory 
f r am ew ork) all ow ed i nvest ors to i ncrease the ri sk of thei r  port f ol i os.  It  is not  cert ain,  
how ever,   t hat   mo r e sophi sti cated r i sk- m anagem ent   system s w oul d have prevented t he 
cri sis because such system s are unabl e t o m odel   hi gh-i m pact  and l ow-probabi l i t y r i sks. 
The  cri sis wa s   t r i ggered by we s t ern credit ors r eassessing t hei r   l endi ng t o Sout h Ko r ea, 19
wh i ch w as prom pt ed by t he cont agion eff ects of t he Thai  cri sis. I n addi t i on,
i nt ernat i onal  credit ors reali sed that  the abi l i t y of the K orean governm ent  to honour it s 
i mp l i cit   or  expl i cit   guarantees wa s   eroded  by  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea' s practi ce of  deposi t i ng 
a l arge  part   of  i t s f oreign  exchange r eserves wi t h  Ko r ean Bank  branches overseas.  Thus,  
i nt ernat i onal  lenders did w hat  wa s  r ati onal  fr om  t hei r  indi vi dual  poi nt  of vi ew , wh i ch 
wa s   t o r efuse t o r ol l over  or  r enew  l oans t o Sout h Ko r ean banks.   Cha r t   2 show s t hat   t he 
pani c r esult ed i n  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea’s f or eign exchange hol di ngs decli ni ng sharpl y.   Thi s 
created seri ous l i qui di t y probl em s f or  Sout h Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons because t hey 
we r e borr ow i ng  short -term  and l endi ng l ong-t erm.
Cha r t  5 show s t he assets and l i abil i t i es of the Bank of Ko r ea. In l ate 1997/ earl y 1998 
t here wa s   a sharp  decli ne  i n  t he  assets of  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea.  Ther e wa s   also an i ncrease 
t he l i abil i t i es of the Bank of Ko r ea, refl ecti ng t he IMF  r escue package. T he m assive 
i ncrease in t he Bank of Ko r ea’s assets and t he di f f erence betwe e n  i t s assets and
l i abil i t i es over t he subsequent  t w o years indi cates the cri sis w as largel y due t o a 
l i qui di t y probl em . The r apid recovery of the Sout h K orean econom y aft er the cri sis is 
consi stent  wi t h  t hi s argum ent .
The I MF  wa s  i nvol ved i n al l eviati ng Sout h K oreas li qui di t y probl em s. The I MF
announced on t he 4 D ecem ber 1997 i t s approval  f or a three-year-stand-by credit  
equi val ent  t o $21 bi l l i on i n order  t o support   t he l i berali sati on program ;  $5. 6 bi l l i on wa s  
ma d e   avail able i mme d i ately.   Wi t h t he I MF   acti ng as an ' I LLR' ,   t he Ba nk  of  Ko r ea wa s  
able to i nt ervene and t ake over som e of the foreign l i abil i t i es of fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons.  
I ndeed,  Cha r t   4 i ndi cates t hat   t he l i abil i t i es of  DMBs   we r e r educed f r om  $48. 26 bi l l i on 
i n N ovem ber  1997 t o $31. 95 bi l l i on i n Decem ber  1997,   wh i l e Cha r t   5 i ndi cates t hat   t he 20
l i abil i t i es of  t he  Bank  of  Ko r ea i ncreased f r om   $0. 64  bi l l i on  i n  N ovem ber  1997  t o  $9. 83 
bi l l i on i n D ecem ber 1997.  Wi t h t he IM F acti ng as an ILLR,  along w i t h a
mi croeconom i c restr uct uri ng package, confi dence i n the Sout h K orean econom y soon 
r eturned.
6.   S u mma r y   and  concludi ng  rem arks
Thi s paper presents new  result s on t he Sout h K orean fi nanci al cri sis using a uni que 
survey of  I MF / Wo r l d Bank off i cials and Sout h Ko r ean econom i sts w ho had f i r st-hand
experi ence of  the cri sis. The s ur vey i s used to focus t he analysi s on part i cular factors 
associated wi t h f i nanci al  l i berali sati on:   over-opt i mi sm ,  mo r al  hazard due t o governm ent  
safety net s, and m oral hazard due t o decl i ni ng fr anchise values.  Al l  t hese factors, 
com bined wi t h w eaknesses i n prudent i al  r egul ati on,   r esult ed i n i ncreased r i sk-taking  by 
banks,  wh i ch m anif ested it self  in t he form o f  ma t uri t y m i s-m atches bet w een forei gn-
currency denom i nat ed assets and l i abil i t i es. Wh e n  i nt ernat i onal  credit ors'  re-assessed
t he  Sout h  Ko r ean econom y,   i n  t he  l i ght   of  t he  Thai   cri sis and  i t s cont agion  eff ects i n  t he 
r egion,  t hey di scovered that  t he Sout h K orean governm ent ' s abil i t y t o honour t he
obl i gat i ons of  Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons wa s   severely l i mi t ed.  Wh a t   wa s   r ati onal   f or 
i nt ernat i onal   l enders t o do on an i ndi vi dual   basi s wa s ,   of  course,  t o r efuse t o r enew  or 
r ol l over  l oans  t o  Sout h  Ko r ea.  Ho we v e r ,   t he  absence of  an I LLR  m eant  t hat   t he  l i qui di t y 
cri sis wa s   able t o  t r i gger  a f ul l -blow n  f i nanci al  cri sis,  wi t h  wi despread bankruptcies.
An  i m port ant pol i cy lesson t o be l earnt  fr om  our analysi s is that  capit al account  
l i berali sati on erodes t he abil i t y of  nat i onal   centr al  banks t o act  as l enders of  l ast  r esort ,  
w eakening an i m port ant  safety val ve of  f r acti onal   r eserve banki ng.     Even wo r se,  i n an 
envi r onm ent  wh e r e agents are learni ng about  t he ' new  m odel '  of t he fi nanci all y21
l i berali sed econom y,   t hey ma y   cont i nue t o assum e t he existence of  i mp l i cit   or  expl i cit  
safety net s,  t hereby t aking advant age of  t he wi dened r i sk-taking opport uni t i es.    Du e   t o 
t hese factors, capit al account  l i berali sati on can prove cat astr ophi c unl ess it  i s
accom panied by prudent i al  m easures aime d   at  l i mi t i ng r i sk-taking,   part i cularl y f oreign-
curr ency li qui di t y ri sk. Such m easures w il l  essenti all y w ork l i ke capit al cont r ol s, 
l i mi t i ng t he abil i t y of  dom est i c f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons t o acqui r e cert ain t ypes of  f oreign 
assets.  The onl y al t ernat i ve t o t hi s is to est abli sh an eff ecti ve ILLR,  wh i ch m ay be 
i mp r acti cable or pol i t i call y unacceptable, gi ven t hat  an eff ecti ve ILLR woul d requi r e 
unl i mi t ed r esources.
9
A not her  pol i cy l esson,   wh i ch t o  som e extent  appears t o  have  alr eady  been l earnt   i n  bot h 
As i a and Wa s h i ngt on,   i s t o curb t he euphori a associated wi t h f i nanci al  l i berali sati on.   I n 
addi t i on,  a height ened aw areness of the ri sks em anati ng fr om  fi nanci al li berali sati on 
coul d,   i n  t he  f ut ure,  prove  t o  be  one  of  t he  keys  t o  successful   f i nanci al  l i berali sati on.
Re f erences
Ba l i no,  T.  J. T.  and U bi de,  A.  (1999).  ‘The Kor ean Financi al Cr i sis of 1997 – A
St r ategy of Fi nanci al  Sector r eform. ’I MF  Wo r k i ng Paper N o.  99/ 28.
Wa s h i ngt on  D.   C. :   I nt ernat i onal   M onet ary  Fund
Ca pr i o,  G.  ( 1992).  ‘ Pol i cy U ncert aint y,  I nforma t i on A sym m et r i es, and Financi al
I nt erme d i ati on. ’W orl d  Bank  Pol i cy Res ear ch  Wo r k i ng  Papers,   No .   853.
9 St r engt heni ng t he rol e of the IMF  t o act as ILLR -as  f or exam ple through i t s new  Cont i ngent  Cr edit  
Li ne ( CCL)   f acil i t y -   w oul d  go  som e wa y   t ow ard  addressing  t hi s probl em  but   coul d  never  be  as eff ecti ve 
as dom esti c LLR  arr angem ent s, thereby l eaving consi derable scope for prudent i al cont r ol s of capit al 
f l ows by dom est i c m onet ary aut hori t i es. An  a l t ernat i ve arr angem ent  is to use corporate styl e paym ent s 
standst i l l s as  suggest ed  by  Mi l l er  and  Zhang  ( 2000).22
Cor sett i ,   G. ,   Pesent i ,   P.   and Roubi ni ,   N.   ( 1999).   ‘ Paper   Ti gers? A  M odel   of  t he As i an 
Cr i sis’,European  Econom i c Review ,  Vo l .   43,   pp.   1211-1236.
De me t r i ades,  P.   O.   and  Lui nt el,   K.   B.   ( 2001).   ‘ Fi nanci al  Re s t r aint s i n  t he  Sout h  Ko r ean 
Mi r acle.’Journal   of   developm ent   Econom i cs,  Vo l .   64,   pp.   459-479.
D ool ey,  M.   P.   and  Shi n,   I .   ( 2000).   ‘ Pr i vat e I nfl ow s  wh e n   Cr i ses are An t i cipat ed:  A  Ca s e  
St udy  of  Ko r ea.’   NBER  Wo r k i ng  Paper  Seri es,   No .   7992.
Fam a,   E.   F.   ( 1980).   ‘ A gency Pr obl em s and  The  Theor y  of  The  Fi r m. ’   Journal   of   Pol i t i cal
Econom y,   Vo l .   88,   pp.   288-307.
Kn i ght ,   F.   H.   ( 1921).   Ri sk,  U ncertai nt y  and  prof i t.  Bos t on:   H ought on  Mi f f l i n.
Fr y,  M.  J. (1995).  M oney, Int erest and banki ng i n Econom i c developm ent (2
nd Ed. ) .
London:   John  H opki ns  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
Gr eenw ald,  B.  C.  and St i gl i t z, J. E.  (1990).  ‘M acroeconom i c M odel s w it h Equi t y and 
Cr edit  Ra t i oni ng. ’  I n As y mme t ric Inf orm at i on,  Corporat e Finance,  and
I nvestme n t   ( ed.  R.   Gl enn  H ubbard).   Chi cago:   Chi cago  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
Gr eenw ald,   B.   C. ,   Levi nson,   A.   and  St i gl i t z,  J.  E.   ( 1993).   ‘ Ca pi t al  Ma r ket   I mp e r f ecti ons 
and Regi onal  Econom i c D evelopm ent . ’  In Fi nance and D evelopm ent :  Issues 
and  Exper i ence ( ed.  A.   Gi ovanni ni ) ,   Ca mbr i dge:   Ca mbr i dge  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
He l l m ann,  T.  F. ,  Mu r dock,  K.  C.  and St i gl i t z, J. E.  (2000).  ‘Li berali zati on,  Mo r al
H azard i n Banki ng,  and Prudent i al Regul ati on:  Ar e C apit al Requi r em ents
Enough?’Am eri can  Econom i c Review ,  Vo l .   90,   No .   1,   pp.   147-165.
He r r i ng,  R.  J. ( 1999).  ‘ Cr edit  Ri sk and Fi nanci al I nst abil i t y. ’O x f ord Revi ew  of
Econom i c Pol i cy,  Vo l .   15,   pp.   63-79.
H uang,  H.  and X u,  C.  (1999).  ‘Fi nanci al Inst i t ut i ons and t he Fi nanci al Cr i sis in East  
As i a.’European  Econom i c Review ,  Vo l .   43,   pp.   903-914.23
Mc Ki nnon,  R.  and Pi l l ,  H.  ( 1997).  ‘ Cr edibl e Econom i c Liberali sati on and
Ov e r borr ow i ng. ’Amer i can Econom i c Review  P apers and Proceedings,   Vo l .   87,  
pp.   189-193.
Mi l l er,  M.  and Zhang,  L.  (2000).  ‘Sovereign Li qui di t y Cri sis: the St r ategic C ase for a 
Paym ent s St andst i l l . ’   The  Econom i c Journal ,   Vo l .   110,   pp.   335-362.
St i gl i t z, J. E.  and W ei ss, A.  ( 1981).  ‘ Cr edit  Ra t i oni ng i n M arket s w it h Imp e r f ect 
I nforma t i on. ’Ameri can  Econom i c Review ,  Vo l .   71,   No .   3,   pp.   393-410.
Wi l l i am son,   O. E.   ( 1986).   Econom i c O rgani sati on: Fi rm s, M arkets and Pol i cy C ontrol.
Br i ght on,   Engl and:   W heatsheaf  Books  Lt d.24
Tabl e 1  - Ov e r -opt i mi sm
Qu e s t i on Y es  ( %) No   ( % ) M aybe  ( % ) D on’t   know   ( %) No   r esponse  ( %)
SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash
Mo s t   analyst s now   argue  t hat   econom i c actors had  over-
opt i mi sti c expectati ons  about   prospect s of  Eas t   As i an 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   t he  I MF   and  t he  Wo r l d  Bank  alwa y s  
produced  accurate and  obj ecti ve  assessm ents of  t he 
prospect s of  Eas t   As i an econom i es ( i n  t hei r   publ i cati ons,  





















-   I f   yes,   coul d  i t   be  t he  case t hat   t hey  ma y   have  cont r i but ed 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   t he  we s t ern  me d i a and/ or  we s t ern 
f i nanci al  analyst s pl ayed a r ol e i n  creati ng  over- opt i mi sti c





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  pl ayed a 
r ol e i n creati ng over- opt i mi sti c expectati ons  about  





















No t es:  ( 1)  Per centages ma y   not   t ot al  100  due  t o  r oundi ng.   ( 2)  SK  and  Wa s h   r efer  t o  i nt ervi ew ees based  i n  Sout h  Ko r ea and  Wa s h i ngt on,   r especti vel y.25
Tabl e 2  - Mo r al  hazard  and  f i nanci al  r eform
Qu e s t i on Y es  ( %) No   ( % ) M aybe  ( % ) D on’t   know   ( %) No   Response  ( %)
SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash
Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  i n  Ko r ea enjoyed 





















-I f   so,  do  you  t hi nk  t hat   t hese  guarantees  encouraged 





















-W e r e t he  i mp l i cit   guarantees a signi f i cant  f actor 
behi nd  t he  cri sis?
a) The pri me   cause 6  ( 20. 69)  1  ( 6. 67)
b) Cont r i but ory  f act or  19  ( 65. 52)  11  ( 78. 57)





W ho  do  you  t hi nk  wa s   t he  pri me   benefi ciary  f r om   t he  r escue
packages t hat   we r e put   t oget her  aft er  t he  cri sis?
a) D om esti c corporati ons  ( i . e.  chaebols)  3  ( 10. 34)  2  ( 13. 33)
b) D om esti c banks  6  ( 20. 69)  1  ( 6. 67)







Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   r escue packages enabled dom est i c banks 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   r escue packages enabled i nt ernat i onal  





















Ha v e   t here been any  signi f i cant  changes i n  t he  senior 
m anagem ent   and/ or  board  of  di r ectors of  t r oubl ed f i nanci al 





















We r e t hose  t hought   r esponsi bl e f or  t he  t r oubl es r em oved 























Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   t i ght er  prudent i al  r egul ati on  coul d  have 






















No t e:  See Tabl e 1.26
Tabl e 3:   Fi nanci al  Li berali sati on
Qu e s t i on Y es  ( %) No   ( % ) M aybe  ( % ) D on’t   know     ( %) No   r esponse    ( %)
SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash
M any  econom i sts bel i eve t hat   f i nanci al  l i berali sati on 
( FL) :   t he  r em oval   of  i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s and  capit al 
cont r ol s)  l eads t o  hi gher  i nvest me n t   r eturns  ( mo r e 
product i ve  i nvest me n t s,  mo r e eff i cient  all ocati on  of 





















-G i ven  t hi s,  do  you  bel i eve t hat   FL  ma y   have  pl ayed
som e r ol e i n  creati ng  over- opt i mi sti c expectati ons 





















Som e  econom i sts bel i eve t hat   FL  l eads t o  i ncreased r i sks 
i n  t he  f i nanci al  system  ( e.g.   exchange r ate r i sk,  credit  





















Di d  Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  have  i n  pl ace t he  r i sk 
m anagem ent   system s r equi r ed t o  m anage  t he  new   t ypes 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   Ko r ean f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  we r e 
equi pped  wi t h  t he  hum an  capit al  and  expert i se t o 
adequately  m anage  t he  r i sks associated wi t h  t he 













No t e:  See Tabl e 1.27
Tabl e 3  ( Cont i nued)
Qu e s t i on Y es  ( %) No   ( % ) M aybe  ( % ) D on’t   know     ( %)No   r esponse    ( %)
SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash
Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   t he  i nst i t ut i onal   f r am ew ork  of  prudent i al 
r egul ati on  and supervi sion  wa s   suff i cientl y  we l l   devel oped  t o 
deal  wi t h  t he  r i sks associated wi t h  subst anti al  vol um es  of 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   FL  aff ected t he  profi t   ma r gi ns  of  f i nanci al 
i nst i t ut i ons?
a ) Up wa r ds  5  ( 17. 24)  0  ( 0)
b ) Do wn wa r ds  19  ( 65. 52)  8  ( 53. 33)









Taki ng  i nt o  account   t he  new   t ypes  of  r i sks as we l l   as t he 
r esponses  of  f i nanci al  i nst i t ut i ons  and  r egulators,  w oul d  you  say
t hat   on  bal ance FL  i ncreased t he  r i sks f aced by  t he  Ko r ean 





















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   FL  wa s   a signi f i cant  f actor  behi nd  t he  cri sis?
a) V ery  signi f i cant  8  ( 27. 59)  5  ( 33. 33)
b) Signi f i cant  17  ( 58. 62)  7  ( 46. 67)









Tabl e 4  - Concl udi ng  quest i ons
Qu e s t i on Y es  ( %) No   ( % ) M aybe ( % ) D on’t   know   ( %) No   r esponse  ( %)
SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash SK W ash






















Do   you  t hi nk  t hat   we s t ern  i nvest ors ( i ncl udi ng 
f und-m anagers)  over -reacted ( pani cked 
unnecessari l y)  wh e n   t hey  decided  not   t o 
r enew /r ol l over  l oans  and  ot her  credit s t o 





















-I f   so,  how   i m port ant  wa s   t hi s as a f actor 
i n  exacerbat i ng  t he  cri sis?
a) The pri me   cause 11  ( 37. 93)  6  ( 40. 00)
b) Cont r i but ory  f actor  16  ( 55. 17)  7  ( 46. 67)







-D o   you  t hi nk  t hat   i l l i qui d  borr ow ers 





















No t e:  See Tabl e 1.29
Appendi x
Tabl e A1 :   Pr ofi l e of  Respondent s at  t i me   of  July  1997  ( i nt ervi ew s conduct ed duri ng 
10/ 4-20/ 4/ 00  i n  Seoul )  
I nst i t ut i on President i al
c o mmi ssion  on 
f i nanci al  r eform
Di r ector/ Boa r dS e n i or





Bank  of  Ko r ea - 2 1 2
Ko r ea
De v e l opm ent
I nst i t ut e
1- 1 2
Mi ni str y  of 
Fi nance
-2 - -
Ko r ea  I nst i t ut e  of 
Fi nance
12 1
Ko r ea  Sm al l  
Bus i ness r esearch 
I nst i t ut e
1- - -
Econom i c
R esearch I nst i t ut e
-1 - -
A cadem ic1 - - -
Fi nanci al
I nst i t ut i ons:
Ko r ea Exchange 
Bank  R. I .
-- 1 -
Ko r ea Fi r st  Ba nk - - - 2
Ci t y  Ba nk - - 1 -
I ndust r i al  Bank  of 
Ko r ea
-- 2 -
Cr edit   Swi ss Fi r st 
Bos t on
-- 1 -
Ko r ea Long  Ter m 
Cr edit   Ba nk
-- - 1
Chaebol s:
H yundai   R. I .- -1 1
H anw ha R. I .- -- 1
Tot al 4 5 10 10
No t es:  ( 1)  R. I .   m eans Re s e a r ch I nst i t ut e.  ( 2)  Ko r ea I nst i t ut e of  Fi nance:   R esearch I nst i t ut e 
ow ned  by  c o mme r cial  banks.30
  Fi gure 1















i ndi f f erence curve
Ef f i cient  port f ol i o
f r ont i er
Loan  r i s k-   r eturn 
f r ont i er  LF0































Por t f ol i o  standard  devi ati on  ( σ)31
Fi gure 2





















































  1996 07
  1996 10
  1997 01
  1997 04
  1997 07
  1997 10
  1998 01
  1998 04
  1998 07
  1998 10
  1 9 9 9   0 1
  1999 04
  1 9 9 9   0 7
  1999 10
  2000 01
  2000 04
  2000 07
  2000 10








t Na t i on-wi de  Co mme r cial  Banks  Ge n e r al  Loans
Ti me   D eposi t s(L ess t han  6  M ont hs)  ( DMB)
Ti me   D eposi t s(5  Y ear)   ( DMB)







  1996 07
  1996 10
  1997 01
  1997 04
  1997 07
  1997 10
  1998 01
  1998 04
  1998 07
  1998 10
  1999 01
  1999 04
  1999 07
  1 9 9 9   1 0
  2000 01
  2000 04
  2000 07
  2 0 0 0   1 0













e Tr ust   A ccount s l oans
M oney  i n  t r ust - Cor porate
M oney  i n  t r ust - H ousehol d
M oney  i n  t r ust - I nst all me n t
M oney  i n  t r ust - De v e l opm ent
Sour ce:  Bank  of  Ko r ea 34








  1990 01
  1990 07
  1991 01
  1991 07
  1992 01
  1992 07
  1993 01
  1993 07
  1994 01
  1994 07
  1995 01
  1995 07
  1996 01
  1996 07
  1997 01
  1997 07
  1998 01
  1998 07
  1999 01
  1999 07
  2000 01
  2000 07
  2001 01




















Source:  Bank  of  Ko r ea







































































































































































































































































x Re t ail   Banks
Fi nanci al  Ser vi ces
KOSPI S
Source Da t a St r eam35










  1990 01
  1990 07
  1991 01
  1991 07
  1992 01
  1992 07
  1993 01
  1993 07
  1994 01
  1994 07
  1995 01
  1995 07
  1996 01
  1996 07
  1997 01
  1997 07
  1998 01
  1998 07
  1999 01
  1999 07
  2000 01
  2000 07
















FOREI GN  ASSETS  ( DMB)
FOREI GN  LI ABI LI TI ES  ( DMB)
ASSETS- LI ABI LI TI ES  ( DMB)
Source:  Bank  of  Ko r ea








  1990 01
  1990 07
  1991 01
  1991 07
  1992 01
  1992 07
  1993 01
  1993 07
  1994 01
  1994 07
  1995 01
  1995 07
  1996 01
  1996 07
  1997 01
  1997 07
  1998 01
  1998 07
  1999 01
  1999 07
  2000 01
  2000 07
















FOREI GN  ASSETS  ( BOK)
FOREI GN  LI ABI LI TI ES  ( BOK)
ASSETS- LI ABI LI TI ES  ( BOK)
Source:  Bank  of  Ko r ea